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Abstract
Randomized smoothing has been shown to provide good certified-robustness guar-
antees for high-dimensional classification problems. It uses the probabilities of
predicting the top two most-likely classes around an input point under a smoothing
distribution to generate a certified radius for a classifier’s prediction. However, most
smoothing methods do not give us any information about the confidence with which
the underlying classifier (e.g., deep neural network) makes a prediction. In this
work, we propose a method to generate certified radii for the prediction confidence
of the smoothed classifier. We consider two notions for quantifying confidence:
average prediction score of a class and the margin by which the average prediction
score of one class exceeds that of another. We modify the Neyman-Pearson lemma
(a key theorem in randomized smoothing) to design a procedure for computing the
certified radius where the confidence is guaranteed to stay above a certain threshold.
Our experimental results on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets show that using
information about the distribution of the confidence scores allows us to achieve a
significantly better certified radius than ignoring it. Thus, we demonstrate that extra
information about the base classifier at the input point can help improve certified
guarantees for the smoothed classifier.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, in which a nearly
imperceptible perturbation is added to an input image to completely alter the network’s prediction
[27, 22, 11]. Several empirical defenses have been proposed over the years to produce classifiers that
are robust to such perturbations [18, 3, 15, 7, 21, 13, 10]. However, without robustness guarantees,
it is often the case that these defenses are broken by stronger attacks [4, 1, 29, 28]. Certified
defenses, such as those based on convex-relaxation [30, 24, 26, 5] and interval-bound propagation
[12, 16, 8, 23], address this issue by producing robustness guarantees within a neighborhood of an
input point. However, due to the complexity of present-day neural networks, these methods have seen
limited use in high-dimensional datasets such as ImageNet.
Randomized smoothing has recently emerged as the state-of-the-art technique for certifying adver-
sarial robustness with the scalability to handle datasets as large as ImageNet [19, 20, 6, 25]. This
defense uses a base classifier, e.g. a deep neural network, to make predictions. Given an input
image, a smoothing method queries the top class label at a large number of points in a Gaussian
distribution surrounding the image, and returns the label with the majority vote. If the input image is
perturbed slightly, the new voting population overlaps greatly with the smoothing distribution around
the original image, and so the vote outcome can change only a small amount.
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Conventional smoothing throws away a lot of information about class labels, and has limited ca-
pabilities that make its outputs difficult to use for decision making. Conventional classification
networks with softmax layers output a confidence score that can be interpreted as the degree of
certainty the network has about the class label [14]. This is a crucial piece of information in real
world decision-making applications such as self-driving cars [2] and disease-diagnosis networks [17],
where safety is paramount.
In contrast, standard Gaussian smoothing methods take binary votes at each randomly sampled point
– i.e., each point votes either for or against the most likely class, without conveying any information
about how confident the network is in the class label. This may lead to scenarios where a point
has a large certified radius but the underlying classifier has a low confidence score. For example,
imagine a 2-way classifier for which a large portion, say 95%, of the sampled points predict the
same class. In this case, the certified radius will be very large (indicating that this image is not an
`2-bounded adversarial example). However, it could be that each point predicts the top class with
very low confidence. In this case, one should have very low confidence in the class label, despite the
strength of the adversarial certificate. A Gaussian smoothing classifier counts a 51% confidence vote
exactly the same way as a 99% confidence vote, and this important information is erased.
In this work, we restore confidence information in certified classifiers by proposing a method that
produces class labels with a certified confidence score. Instead of taking a vote at each Gaussian
sample around the input point, we average the confidence scores from the underlying base classifier
for each class. The prediction of our smoothed classifier is given by the argmax of the expected scores
of all the classes. Using the probability distribution of the confidence scores under the Gaussian, we
produce a lower bound on how much the expected confidence score of the predicted class can be
manipulated by a bounded perturbation to the input image. To do this, we adapt the Neyman-Pearson
lemma, the fundamental theorem that characterizes the worst-case behaviour of the classifier under
regular (binary) voting, to leverage the distributional information about the confidence scores. The
lower bound we obtain is monotonically decreasing with the `2-norm of the perturbation and can be
expressed as a linear combination of the Gaussian CDF at different points. This allows us to design
an efficient binary search based algorithm to compute the radius within which the expected score is
guaranteed to be above a given threshold. Our method endows smoothed classifiers with the new and
important capability of producing confidence scores.
We study two notions of measuring confidence: the average prediction score of a class, and the margin
by which the average prediction score of one class exceeds that of another. The average prediction
score is the expected value of the activations in the final softmax-layer of a neural network under
the smoothing distribution. A class is guaranteed to be the predicted class if its average prediction
score is greater than one half (since softmax values add up to one) or it maintains a positive margin
over all the other classes. For both these measures, along with the bounds described in the previous
paragraph, we also derive naive lower bounds on the expected score at a perturbed input point that do
not use the distribution of the scores. We perform experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets
which show that using information about the distribution of the scores allows us to achieve better
certified guarantees than the naive method.
2 Background and Notation
Gaussian smoothing, introduced by Cohen et al. in 2019, relies on a “base classifier,” which is a
mapping f : Rd → Y where Rd is the input space and Y is a set of k classes. It defines a smoothed
classifier f¯ as
f¯(x) = argmax
c∈Y
P(f(x+ δ) = c)
where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I) is sampled from an isometric Gaussian distribution with variance σ2. It returns
the class that is most likely to be sampled by the Gaussian distribution centered at point x. Let p1
and p2 be the probabilities of sampling the top two most likely classes. Then, f¯ is guaranteed to be
constant withing an `2-ball of radius
R =
σ
2
(
Φ−1(p1)− Φ−1(p2)
)
where Φ−1 is the inverse CDF of the standard Gaussian distribution [6]. For a practical certification
algorithm, a lower bound p1 on p1 and an upper bound p2 = 1− p1 on p2, with probability 1− α for
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a given α ∈ (0, 1), are obtained and the certified radius is given by R = σΦ−1(p1). This analysis is
tight for `2 perturbations; the bound is achieved by a worst-case classifier in which all the points in
the top-class are restricted to a half-space separated by a hyperplane orthogonal to the direction of
the perturbation.
In our discussion, we diverge from the standard notation described above, and assume that the base
classifier f maps points in Rd to a k-tuple of confidence scores. Thus, f : Rd → (a, b)k for some
a, b ∈ R and a < b1. We define the smoothed version of the classifier as
f¯(x) = E
δ∼N (0,σ2I)
[f(x+ δ)],
which is the expectation of the class scores under the Gaussian distribution centered at x. The final
prediction is made by taking an argmax of the expected scores. This definition has been studied
by Salman et al. in [25] to develop an attack against smoothed classifiers which when used in an
adversarial training setting helps boost the performance of conventional smoothing. The goal of this
work is to identify a radius around an image x within which the expected confidence score of the
predicted class i, i.e. f¯i(x) = E[fi(x+ δ)], remains above a given threshold c ∈ (a, b)2.
We measure confidence using two different notions. The first measure is the average prediction
score of a class as output by the final softmax layer. We denote the prediction score function with
h : Rd → (0, 1)k and define the average for class i as h¯i(x) = E[hi(x + δ)]. The second one is
the margin mi(x) = hi(x)−maxj 6=i hj(x) by which class i beats every other class in the softmax
prediction score. In section 4, we show that the expected margin m¯i(x) = E[mi(x + δ)] for the
predicted class is a lower-bound on the gap in average prediction scores of the top two class labels.
Thus, m¯i(x) > 0 implies that i is the predicted class.
3 Certifying Confidence Scores
Standard Gaussian smoothing for establishing certified class labels essentially works by averaging
binary (0/1) votes from every image in a Gaussian cloud around the input image, x. It then establishes
the worst-case class boundary given the recorded vote, and produces a certificate. The same machinery
can be applied to produce a naive certificate for confidence score; rather than averaging binary votes,
we simply average scores. We then produce the worst-case class distribution, in which each class
lives in a separate half-space, and generate a certificate for this worst case.
However, the naive certificate described above throws away a lot of information. When continuous-
values scores are recorded, we obtain not only the average score, but also the distribution of scores
around the input point. By using this distributional information, we can potentially create a much
stronger certificate.
To see why, consider the extreme case of a “flat” classifier function for which every sample in the
Gaussian cloud around x returns the same top-class prediction score of 0.55. In this case, the average
score is 0.55 as well. For a function where the distribution of score votes is concentrated at 0.55
(or any other value great than 1/2), the average score will always remain at 0.55 for any perturbation
to x, thus yielding an infinite certified radius. However, when using the naive approach that throws
away the distribution, the worst-case class boundary with average vote 0.55 is one with confidence
score 1.0 everywhere in a half-space occupying 0.55 probability, and 0.0 in a half-space with 0.45
probability. This worst-case, which uses only the average vote, produces a very small certified radius,
in contrast to the infinite radius we could obtain from observing the distribution of votes.
Below, we first provide a simple bound that produces a certificate by averaging scores around the
input image, and directly applying the framework from [6]. Then, we describe a more refined method
that uses distributional information to obtain stronger bounds.
3.1 A baseline method using Gaussian means
In this section, we describe a method that uses only the average confidence over the Gaussian
distribution surrounding x, and not the distribution of values, to bound how much the expected score
can change when x is perturbed with an `2 radius of R units. This is a straightforward extension
1(a, b) denotes the open interval between a and b.
2fi(x) denotes the ith component of f(x)
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of Cohen et al.’s [6] work to our framework. It shows that regardless the behaviour of the base
classifier f , its smoothed version f¯ changes slowly which is similar to the observation of bounded
Lipschitz-ness made by Salman et al. in [25] (Lemma 2). The worst-case classifier in this case
assumes value a in one half space and b in other, with a linear boundary between the two as illustrated
in figure 1a. The following theorem formally states the bounds, the proof of which is deferred to the
appendix.
Theorem 1. Let ei(x) and ei(x) be a lower-bound and an upper-bound respectively on the expected
score f¯i(x) for class i and, let pi(x) =
ei(x)−a
b−a and pi(x) =
ei(x)−a
b−a . Then, for a perturbation x
′ of
the input x, such that, ‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ R,
f¯i(x
′) ≥ bΦσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x))−R) + a(1− Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x))−R)) (1)
and
f¯i(x
′) ≤ bΦσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x)) +R) + a(1− Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x)) +R))
where Φσ is the CDF of the univariate Gaussian distribution with σ2 variance, i.e., N (0, σ2).
3.2 Proposed certificate
The bounds in section 3.1 are a simple application of the Neyman-Pearson lemma to our framework.
But this method discards a lot of information about how the class scores are distributed in the Gaussian
around the input point. Rather than consolidating the confidence scores from the samples into an
expectation, we propose a method that uses the cumulative distribution function of the confidence
scores to obtain improved bounds on the expected class scores.
Given an input x, we draw m samples from the Gaussian distribution around x. We use the prediction
of the base classifier f on these points to generate bounds on the distribution function of the scores
for the predicted class. These bounds, in turn, allow us to bound the amount by which the expected
score of the class will decrease under an `2 perturbation. Finally, we apply binary search to compute
the radius for which this lower bound on the expected score remains above c.
Consider the sampling of scores around an image x using a Gaussian distribution. Let the probability
with which the score of class i is above s be
pi,s(x) = P
δ∼N (0,σ2I)
(fi(x+ δ) ≥ s).
For point x and class i, consider the random variable Z = −fi(x+ δ) where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let
F (s) = P(Z ≤ s) be the cumulative distribution function of Z and Fm(s) = 1m
∑m
j=1 1{Zj ≤ s}
be its empirical estimate. For a given α ∈ (0, 1), the Dvoretzky–Kiefer–Wolfowitz inequality [9]
says that, with probability 1− α, the true CDF is bounded by the empirical CDF as follows:
Fm(s)−  ≤ F (s) ≤ Fm(s) + , ∀s,
where  =
√
ln 2/α
2m . Thus, pi,s(x) is also bounded within± of its empirical estimate
∑m
j=1 1{fi(x+
δj) ≥ s}.
The following theorem bounds the expected class score under an `2 perturbation using bounds on the
cumulative distribution of the scores.
Theorem 2. Let, for class i, a < s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sn < b be n real numbers and let
pi,sj (x) and pi,sj (x) be upper and lower bounds on pi,sj (x) respectively derived using the Dvoret-
zky–Kiefer–Wolfowitz inequality, with probability 1 − α, for a given α ∈ (0, 1). Then, for a
perturbation x′ of the input x, such that, ‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ R,
f¯i(x
′) ≥ a+ (s1 − a)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,s1(x))−R) +
n∑
j=2
(sj − sj−1)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sj (x))−R) (2)
and
f¯i(x
′) ≤ s1 + (b− sn)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sn(x)) +R) +
n−1∑
j=1
(sj+1 − sj)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sj (x)) +R)
where Φσ is the CDF of the univariate Gaussian distribution with σ2 variance, i.e., N (0, σ2).
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(a) Naive classifier (b) CDF-based classifier
Figure 1: Worst case classifier behaviour using (a) naive approach and (b) CDF-based method. As
the center of the distribution moves from x to x′, the probability mass of the higher values of the
score function (indicated in red) decreases and that of the lower values (indicated in blue) increases,
bringing down the value of the expected score.
The above bounds are tight for `2 perturbations. The worst-case classifier for the lower bound is
one in which the class score decreases from b to a in steps, taking values sn, sn−1, . . . , s1 at each
level. Figure 1b illustrates this case for three intermediate levels. A similar worst-case scenario can
be constructed for the upper bound as well where the class score increases from a to b along the
direction of the perturbation. Even though our theoretical results allow us to derive both upper and
lower bounds for the expected scores, we restrict ourselves to the lower bound in our experimental
results. We provide a proof sketch for this theorem in section 3.3. Our experimental results show that
the CDF-based approach beats the naive bounds in practice by a significant margin, showing that
having more information about the classifier at the input point can help achieve better guarantees.
Computing the certified radius Both the bounds in theorem 2 monotonic in R. So, in order to
find a certified radius, up to a precision τ , such that the lower (upper) bound is above (below) a
certain threshold we can apply binary search which will require at most O(log(1/τ)) evaluations of
the bound.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We present a brief proof for theorem 2. We use a slightly modified version of the Neyman-Pearson
lemma (stated in [6]) which we prove in the appendix.
Lemma 3 (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). Let X and Y be random variables in Rd with densities µX
and µY . Let h : Rd → (a, b) be a function. Then:
1. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd | µY (z)µX(z) ≤ t
}
for some t > 0 and P(h(X) ≥ s) ≥ P(X ∈ S), then
P(h(Y ) ≥ s) ≥ P(Y ∈ S).
2. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd | µY (z)µX(z) ≥ t
}
for some t > 0 and P(h(X) ≥ s) ≤ P(X ∈ S), then
P(h(Y ) ≥ s) ≤ P(Y ∈ S).
SetX to be the smoothing distribution at an input point x and Y to be that at x+ for some perturbation
vector . For a class i, define sets Si,j = {z ∈ Rd | µY (z)/µX(z) ≤ ti,j} for some ti,j > 0, such
that, P(X ∈ Si,j) = pi,sj (x). Similarly, define sets Si,j = {z ∈ Rd | µY (z)/µX(z) ≥ t′i,j} for
some t′i,j > 0, such that, P(X ∈ Si,j) = pi,sj (x). Since, P(fi(X) ≥ sj) ≥ P(X ∈ Si,j), using
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lemma 3 we can say that P(fi(Y ) ≥ si) ≥ P(Y ∈ Si,j). Therefore,
E[fi(Y )] ≥ snP(fi(Y ) ≥ sn) + sn−1(P(fi(Y ) ≥ sn−1)− P(fi(Y ) ≥ sn))
+ · · ·+ s1(P(fi(Y ) ≥ s1)− P(fi(Y ) ≥ s2)) + a(1− P(fi(Y ) ≥ s1))
= a+ (s1 − a)P(fi(Y ) ≥ s1) +
n∑
j=2
(sj − sj−1)P(fi(Y ) ≥ sj)
≥ a+ (s1 − a)P(Y ∈ Si,1) +
n∑
j=2
(sj − sj−1)P(Y ∈ Si,j).
Similarly, P(fi(X) ≥ sj) ≤ P(X ∈ Si,j) implies P(fi(Y ) ≥ sj) ≤ P(Y ∈ Si,j) as per lemma 3.
Therefore,
E[fi(Y )] ≤ bP(fi(Y ) ≥ sn) + sn(P(fi(Y ) ≥ sn−1)− P(fi(Y ) ≥ sn))
+ · · ·+ s1(1− P(fi(Y ) ≥ s1))
= (b− sn)P(fi(Y ) ≥ sn) +
n−1∑
j=1
(sj+1 − sj)P(fi(Y ) ≥ sj) + s1
≤ s1 + (b− sn)P(Y ∈ Si,n) +
n−1∑
j=1
(sj+1 − sj)P(Y ∈ Si,j).
Since, we are smoothing using an isometric Gaussian distribution with σ2 variance, µX = N (x, σ2I)
and µY = N (x+ , σ2I). Then, for some t and β
µY (z)
µY (z)
≤ t ⇐⇒ T z ≤ β
µY (z)
µY (z)
≥ t ⇐⇒ T z ≥ β.
Thus, each of the sets Si,j and Si,j is a half space defined by a hyper-plane orthogonal to the
direction of the perturbation. This simplifies our analysis to one dimension, namely, the one along
the perturbation. For each of the sets Si,j and Si,j , we can find a point on the real number line
Φ−1σ (pi,sj (x)) and Φ
−1
σ (pi,sj (x)) respectively such that the probability of a Gaussian sample to fall
in that set is equal to the Gaussian CDF at that point. Therefore,
f¯i(x+ ) ≥ a+ (s1 − a)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,s1(x))−R) +
n∑
j=2
(sj − sj−1)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sj (x))−R)
and
f¯i(x+ ) ≤ s1 + (b− sn)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sn(x)) +R) +
n−1∑
j=1
(sj+1 − sj)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi,sj (x)) +R)
which completes the proof of theorem 2.
4 Confidence measures
We study two notions of confidence: average prediction score of a class and the margin of average
prediction score between two classes. Usually, neural networks make their predictions by outputting
a prediction score for each class and then taking the argmax of the scores. Let h : Rd → (0, 1)k be
a classifier mapping input points to prediction scores between 0 and 1 for each class. We assume
that the scores are generated by a softmax-like layer, i.e., 0 < hi(x) < 1,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and∑
i hi(x) = 1. For δ ∼ N (0, σ2I), we define average prediction score for a class i as
h¯i(x) = E[hi(x+ δ)].
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The final prediction for the smoothed classifier is made by taking an argmax over the average
prediction scores of all the classes, i.e., argmaxi h¯i(x). Thus, if for a class j, h¯j(x) ≥ 0.5, then
j = argmaxi h¯i(x).
Now, we define margin m at point x for a class i as
mi(x) = hi(x)−max
j 6=i
hj(x).
Thus, if i is the class with the highest prediction score, mi(x) is the lead it has over the second
highest class. And, for any other class mi(x) is the negative of the difference of the scores of that
class with the highest class. We define average margin at point x under smoothing distribution P as
m¯i(x) = E[mi(x+ δ)].
For a pair of classes i and j, we have,
h¯i(x)− h¯j(x) = E[hi(x+ δ)]− E[hj(x+ δ)]
= E[hi(x+ δ)− hj(x+ δ)]
≥ E[hi(x+ δ)−max
j 6=i
hj(x+ δ)]
= E[mi(x+ δ)] = m¯i(x)
h¯i(x) ≥ h¯j(x) + m¯i(x).
Thus, if m¯i(x) > 0, then class i must have the highest average prediction score making it the
predicted class under this notion of confidence measure.
5 Experiments
We conduct several experiments to motivate the use of certified confidence, and to validate the
effectiveness of our proposed CDF-based certificate.
5.1 Does certified radius correlate with confidence score?
A classifier can fail because of an adversarial attack, or because of epistemic uncertainty – a class label
may be uncertain or wrong because of lack of useful features, or because the model was not trained
on sufficient representative data. The use of certified confidence is motivated by the observation that
the original Gaussian averaging, which certifies the security of class labels, does not convey whether
the user should be confident in the label because it neglects epistemic uncertainty.
Figure 2: Prediction Score vs.
Certified Radius.
We demonstrate this with a simple experiment. In figure 2, we show
plots of softmax prediction score vs. certified radius obtained using
smoothed ResNet-110 and ResNet-50 classifiers trained by Cohen
et al. in [6] for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet respectively. The noise level
σ used for this experiment was 0.25. For both models, the certified
radii correlate very little with the prediction scores for the input
images. The CIFAR-10 plot has points with high scores but small
radii. While, for ImageNet, we see a lot of points with low scores but
high radii. This motivates the need for certifying confidence; high
radius does not imply high confidence of the underlying classifier.
This lack of correlation is visualized in figure 3.
In the plots, CIFAR-10 images tend to have a higher prediction score
than ImageNet images which is potentially due to the fact that the
ImageNet dataset has a lot more classes than the CIFAR-10 dataset,
driving the softmax scores down. There is a hard limit (∼ 0.95 for
ImageNet) on the largest radius that can be generated by Cohen
et al.’s certifying algorithm which causes a lot of the ImageNet
points to accumulate at this radius value. This limit comes from the
fact that even if all the samples around an input image vote for the
same class, the lower-bound on the top-class probability is strictly
less than one, which keeps the certified radius within a finite value.
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Radius< 0.2, Confidence Score> 0.7 Radius> 0.5, Confidence Score< 0.4
ImageNet:

radius < 0.4 & conf > 0.6                                                 radius > 0.9 & conf < 0.1

CIFAR-10:

radius < 0.2 & conf > 0.7                                              radius > 0.5 & conf < 0.4

CIFAR-10
Radius< 0.4, Confidence Score> 0.6 Radius> 0.9, Confidence Score< 0.1
ImageNet:

radius < 0.4 & conf > 0.6                                                 radius > 0.9 & conf < 0.1

CIFAR-10:

radius < 0.2 & conf > 0.7                                              radius > 0.5 & conf < 0.4

ImageNet
Figure 3: Certified radius does not correlate well with human visual confidence or network confidence
score. Low radius images on the left have high confidence scores, while the high radius images on
the right all have low confidence scores. There is not a pronounced visual difference between low-
and high-radius images.
5.2 Evaluating the strength of bounds
We use the ResNet-110 and ResNet-50 models trained by Cohen et al. in [6] on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets respectively to generate confidence certificates. These models have been pre-
trained with varying Gaussian noise level σ in the training data. We use the same σ for certifying
confidences as well. We use the same number of samples m = 100, 000 and value of α = 0.001 as
in [6]. We set s1, s2. . . . , sn in theorem 2 such that the number of confidence score values falling in
each of the intervals (a, s1), (s1, s2), . . . , (sn, b) is the same. We chose this method of splitting the
range (a, b), instead of at regular steps, to keep the intervals well-balanced. We present results for
both notions of confidence measure: average prediction score and margin. Figure 4 plots certified
accuracy, using the naive bound and the CDF-based method, for different threshold values for the
top-class average prediction score and the margin at various radii for σ = 0.25. The same experiments
for σ = 0.50 have been included in the appendix.
Each line is for a given threshold for the confidence score. The solid lines represent certificates
derived using the CDF bound and the dashed lines are for ones using the naive bound. For the
baseline certificate (1), we use Hoeffding’s inequality to get a lower-bound on the expected top-class
confidence score ei(x), that holds with probability 1− α, for a given α ∈ (0, 1).
ei(x) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
fi(x+ δj)− (b− a)
√
ln(1/α)
2m
This bound is a reasonable choice because pi(x) differs from the empirical estimate by the same
amount
√
ln(1/α)/2m as pi,s(x) in the proposed CDF-based certificate. In the appendix, we also
show that the baseline certificate, even with the best-possible lower-bound for ei(x), cannot beat our
method for most cases.
We see a significant improvement in certified accuracy (e.g. at radius = 0.25) when certification is
done using the CDF method instead of the naive bound. The confidence measure based on the margin
between average prediction scores yields slightly better certified accuracy when thresholded at zero
than the other measure.
6 Conclusion
While standard certificates can guarantee that a decision is secure, they contain little information
about how confident the user should be in the assigned label. We present a method that certifies the
confidence scores, rather than the labels, of images. By leveraging information about the distribution
of confidence scores around an input image, we produce certificates that beat a naive bound based on
a direct application of the Neyman-Pearson lemma. The results in this work show that certificates can
be strengthened by incorporating more information into the worst-case bound than just the average
vote. We hope this line of research leads to methods for strengthening smoothing certificates based on
other information sources, such as properties of the base classifier or the spatial distribution of votes.
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(a) Average Prediction Score (CIFAR-10) (b) Margin (CIFAR-10)
(c) Average Prediction Score (ImageNet) (d) Margin (ImageNet)
Figure 4: Certified accuracy vs. radius (CIFAR-10 & ImageNet) at different cutoffs for average
confidence score with σ = 0.25. Solid and dashed lines represent certificates computed with and
without CDF bound respectively.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove a slightly modified version of the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Lemma 4 (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). Let X and Y be random variables in Rd with densities µX
and µY . Let h : Rd → (a, b) be a function. Then:
1. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd | µY (z)µX(z) ≤ t
}
for some t > 0 and E[h(X)] ≥ (b− a)P(X ∈ S) + a, then
E[h(Y )] ≥ (b− a)P(Y ∈ S) + a.
2. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd | µY (z)µX(z) ≥ t
}
for some t > 0 and E[h(X)] ≤ (b− a)P(X ∈ S) + a, then
E[h(Y )] ≤ (b− a)P(Y ∈ S) + a.
Proof. Let Sc be the complement set of S.
E[h(Y )]− (b− a)P(Y ∈ S)− a = E[h(Y )]− bP(Y ∈ S)− a(1− P(Y ∈ S))
= E[h(Y )]− bP(Y ∈ S)− aP(Y /∈ S)
=
∫
Rd
h(z)µY (z)dz − b
∫
S
µY (z)dz − a
∫
Sc
µY (z)dz
=
[∫
Sc
h(z)µY (z)dz +
∫
S
h(z)µY (z)dz
]
− b
∫
S
µY (z)dz − a
∫
Sc
µY (z)dz
=
∫
Sc
(h(z)− a)µY (z)dz −
∫
S
(b− h(z))µY (z)dz
≥ t
[∫
Sc
(h(z)− a)µX(z)dz −
∫
S
(b− h(z))µX(z)dz
]
(since a < h(z) < b)
= t
[∫
Rd
h(z)µX(z)dz − b
∫
S
µX(z)dz − a
∫
Sc
µX(z)dz
]
= t [E[h(X)]− bP(X ∈ S)− aP(X /∈ S)]
= t [E[h(X)]− bP(X ∈ S)− a(1− P(X ∈ S))]
= t [E[h(X)]− (b− a)P(X ∈ S)− a] ≥ 0
The second statement can be proven similarly by switching ≥ and ≤.
In the first statement of the lemma, set h to fi, µX to N (x, σ2I) and µY to N (x′, σ2I), and find
a t, such that, P(X ∈ S) = pi(x). Now, since µX and µY are isometric Gaussians with the same
variance,
µY (z)
µX(z)
≤ t ⇐⇒ (x′ − x)T z ≤ β
for some β ∈ R. Therefore, the set S is a half-space defined by a hyper-plane orthogonal to the
perturbation x′ − x. So, if ‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ R, then P(Y ∈ S) ≥ Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x))−R).
f¯i(x
′) = E[fi(Y )]
≥ (b− a)P(Y ∈ S) + a (from the above lemma)
≥ (b− a)Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x))−R) + a
= bΦσ(Φ
−1
σ (pi(x))−R) + a(1− Φσ(Φ−1σ (pi(x))−R))
The upper bound on f¯i(x′) can be derived similarly by applying the second statement of the above
lemma.
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B Proof of Lemma 3
Let Sc be the complement set of S.
P(h(Y ) ≥ s)− P(Y ∈ S) =
∫
Rd
1{h(z) ≥ s}µY (z)dz −
∫
S
µY (z)dz
=
[∫
Sc
1{h(z) ≥ s}µY (z)dz +
∫
S
1{h(z) ≥ s}µY (z)dz
]
−
∫
S
µY (z)dz
=
∫
Sc
1{h(z) ≥ s}µY (z)dz −
∫
S
(1− 1{h(z) ≥ s})µY (z)dz
≥ t
[∫
Sc
1{h(z) ≥ s}µX(z)dz −
∫
S
(1− 1{h(z) ≥ s})µX(z)dz
]
(since 0 ≤ 1{h(z) ≥ s} ≤ 1)
= t
[∫
Rd
1{h(z) ≥ s}µX(z)dz −
∫
S
µX(z)dz
]
= t [P(h(X) ≥ s)− P(X ∈ S)] ≥ 0
The second statement of the lemma can be proven similarly by switching ≥ and ≤.
C Additional Experiments
In section 5.2, we compared the two methods, using Hoeffding’s inequality and Dvoret-
zky–Kiefer–Wolfowitz inequality to derive the required lower bounds, for the certificates. We
repeat the same experiments in figure 5 for σ = 0.50. Then, in figure 6, we show that the CDF-based
method (using the DKW inequality) outperforms the baseline approach regardless of how tight a
lower-bound for ei(x) is used in the baseline certificate (1). We replace ei(x) with the empirical
estimate of the expectation eˆi(x) =
∑m
j=1 fi(x + δj)/m, which is an upper bound on ei(x). And
since bound (1) is an increasing function of ei(x), any valid lower bound ei(x) on the expectation
cannot yield a certified accuracy better than that obtained using eˆi(x). We compare our certificate
with the best-possible baseline certificate for some of Cohen et al.’s ResNet-110 models trained on
the CIFAR-10 dataset using the same value of α as in section 5.2. The baseline mostly stays below
the CDF-based method for both types of confidence measures under the noise levels considered.
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(a) Average Prediction Score (CIFAR-10) (b) Margin (CIFAR-10)
(c) Average Prediction Score (ImageNet) (d) Margin (ImageNet)
Figure 5: Certified accuracy vs. radius (CIFAR-10 & ImageNet) at different cutoffs for average
confidence score with σ = 0.50. Solid and dashed lines represent certificates computed with and
without CDF bound respectively.
(a) Average Prediction Score at σ = 0.25 (b) Margin at σ = 0.25
(c) Average Prediction Score at σ = 0.50 (d) Margin at σ = 0.50
Figure 6: Certified accuracy vs. radius (CIFAR-10 only) at different cutoffs for average confidence
score. Solid lines represent certificates computed with the CDF bound and dashed lines represent the
best-possible baseline certificate.
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